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Abstract
How animal communities arrive at homogeneous behavioural preferences is a central question for studies of cultural evolu-
tion. Here, we investigated whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) would relinquish a pre-existing behaviour to adopt an 
alternative demonstrated by an overwhelming majority of group mates; in other words, whether chimpanzees behave in a 
conformist manner. In each of five groups of chimpanzees (N = 37), one individual was trained on one method of opening a 
two-action puzzle box to obtain food, while the remaining individuals learned the alternative method. Over 5 h of open access 
to the apparatus in a group context, it was found that 4/5 ‘minority’ individuals explored the majority method and three of 
these used this new method in the majority of trials. Those that switched did so after observing only a small subset of their 
group, thereby not matching conventional definitions of conformity. In a further ‘Dyad’ condition, six pairs of chimpanzees 
were trained on alternative methods and then given access to the task together. Only one of these individuals ever switched 
method. The number of observations that individuals in the minority and Dyad individuals made of their untrained method 
was not found to influence whether or not they themselves switched to use it. In a final ‘Asocial’ condition, individuals 
(N = 10) did not receive social information and did not deviate from their first-learned method. We argue that these results 
demonstrate an important influence of social context upon prioritisation of social information over pre-existing methods, 
which can result in group homogeneity of behaviour.
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Introduction
Culture emerges and is maintained by a suite of social learn-
ing mechanisms and biases that govern how social informa-
tion is transmitted and when individuals choose to prioritise 
social information over pre-existing methods. One such pro-
posed bias is conformity, defined as foregoing a pre-exist-
ing behaviour in favour of adopting one demonstrated by a 
majority of conspecifics (Haun and Tomasello 2011; Whiten 
and Van Schaik 2007). This represents an important contrast 
with ‘conformist transmission’, which refers to the tendency 
for naïve individuals to disproportionately copy the behav-
iour of a majority (Boyd and Richerson 1988; Van Leeuwen 
and Haun 2013). Conformity is a well-established bias in 
humans, occurring across varied cultures and age groups 
(Bond and Smith 1996). However, whether non-human spe-
cies exhibit conformist behaviour is a topic of recent debate 
(Claidière and Whiten 2012). While experimental evidence 
has been offered for conformist behaviour in nine-spined 
stickleback fish (Pike and Laland 2010), great tits (Aplin 
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et al. 2015b), vervet monkeys (van de Waal et al. 2013) and 
chimpanzees (Whiten et al. 2005), each of these examples 
has been critiqued for not systematically ruling out alterna-
tive explanations (Acerbi et al. 2016; Haun et al. 2013; Van 
Leeuwen and Haun 2013, 2014; Van Leeuwen et al. 2015). 
For example, it has been suggested that so-called conformist 
individuals could have copied the most frequently observed 
behaviour rather than the behaviour of a majority of indi-
viduals (van Leeuwen et al. 2015; c.f. Aplin et al. 2015a) 
or simply copied one or more individuals at random, which 
could lead to the same effect of acting like a majority in the 
group (Acerbi et al. 2016; c.f. Smaldino et al. 2017). Three 
further studies have experimentally investigated whether 
our closest extant relatives, chimpanzees, behave in a con-
formist way, none of which found evidence to support this 
claim (Haun et al. 2014; Vale et al. 2017; Van Leeuwen et al. 
2013). However, each of these studies had a confound that 
may explain these results. Van Leeuwen et al. (2013) used 
minority subgroups rather than lone minorities faced with an 
overwhelming majority, which we know is critical in moti-
vating conformity effects in humans (Asch 1951). In Haun 
et al. (2014) and Vale et al. (2017), subjects had prior expe-
rience that the majority method was either ineffective (no 
reward given for this method during training) or associated 
with unpalatable food rewards, respectively, before being 
exposed to the majority method. This introduced an asym-
metry in the likely payoffs of each method, which chimpan-
zees are sensitive to when making social learning decisions 
(Van Leeuwen et al. 2013) and may therefore explain the 
lack of conformist behaviour. Human conformity can be suf-
ficiently strong to override such negative valence associated 
with the majority method, but only in a minority of humans 
tested (Asch 1951; Bond and Smith 1996), and this is not a 
critical part of the definition of conformity adopted in our 
opening paragraph. It therefore remains a possibility that 
conformity is more readily expressed by animals in con-
texts that lack this element, and where there is unanimity in 
the observed responses, a hypothesis we thus explore in the 
present study.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Luncz and Boesch (2014) 
offer evidence that, when migrating, wild female chimpan-
zees conform to the new tool-use norms of the community 
they transfer to. Similar effects have been reported in migra-
tory vervet monkeys (van de Waal et al. 2013), great tits 
(Aplin et al. 2015a, b) and possibly meerkats (Thornton et al. 
2010). Furthermore, chimpanzees who explored alternative 
methods after their group was seeded with a method of solv-
ing a puzzle box nevertheless converged on homogeneity of 
behaviour, a disposition the authors suggest may have been 
conformity to the majority preference (Whiten et al. 2005). 
However, this has been suggested to be explicable by rever-
sion to an individual’s first-learned method, a hypothesis that 
cannot be rejected without further experimental testing (Van 
Leeuwen and Haun 2013).
In the present study, we investigated whether chimpan-
zees proficient in a pre-existing minority method (minority 
individual/s = ‘MIN-I’) of opening a puzzle box (Fig. 1), 
and who were naïve to alternative methods, would converge 
on the different behaviour demonstrated in a group context 
by an overwhelming majority of group mates (majority 
individual/s = ‘MAJ-I’). This open-diffusion ‘Group’ con-
dition lasted for a total of 5 h. We predicted that if subjects 
Fig. 1  The box could be opened 
to reveal a food reward by 
either sliding the door entirely 
upwards (b) or entirely down-
wards (c). The resting position 
on presentation is shown in (a). 
The side profile is shown in 
(d). Upon a completed opening, 
the door locked so as to restrict 
access to the alternative reward. 
The anchor platform was 
attached to a trolley with vice 
clamps to stabilise the apparatus
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were to demonstrate conformist behaviour, they would 
maintain their trained behaviour until they had observed a 
majority of their group mates demonstrate, at which point 
they would converge on this majority method. In order to 
explore whether frequency of observations (as opposed to 
number of individuals observed, Van Leeuwen et al. 2015), 
asocial exploration or random copying (Acerbi et al. 2016) 
might account for changes in behavioural preference in the 
Group condition, we introduced two further conditions. In a 
‘Dyad’ condition, we paired individuals who were trained on 
alternative methods of opening the apparatus and observed 
whether either would converge on the behaviour of their 
partner over 1 h of access to the apparatus. We predicted 
that if frequency of observed behaviour or random copying 
can elicit behaviour switching, levels of switching should 
be similar between the Dyad and Group condition. In an 
‘Asocial’ condition, a single individual was trained on one 
method to explore whether they would switch to an alterna-
tive method without social information during 30 min of 
unrestricted access to the task.
Methods
Participants and study site
Participants were 59 chimpanzees (Group condition MIN-I 
N = 5: all female, Group condition MAJ-I: N = 32, 17 
females, Dyad condition N = 12: nine females, Asocial con-
dition N = 10: four females) housed at the National Center 
for Chimpanzee Care located at the Michale E. Keeling 
Center for Comparative Medicine and Research of the Uni-
versity of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center in Bastrop 
(UTMDACC), Texas (see Table 1 for full demographic 
information). The size of groups used in the Group condi-
tion varied between 5 and 9 individuals. Data were collected 
between April and August 2016. All individuals were naïve 
to the apparatus prior to training except two (BER, KUD) 
in the Dyad condition who had previously participated in 
Watson et al. (2017). These individuals were used to pro-
vide sufficient partners for the Dyad condition, but were 
excluded from all analyses. Ethical approval for this study 
was granted by the School of Psychology and Neuroscience 
at the University of St Andrews and the IACUC of UTM-
DACC, adhering to all the legal requirements of US law 
and the American Society of Primatologists’ principles for 
the ethical treatment of non-human primates. All subjects 
voluntarily participated in the testing procedures.
Apparatus
This study employed a two-action, sliding-door puzzle box 
(Fig. 1), a design that has been successfully used to examine 
Table 1  Demographic information for each participating individual
ID Condition Sex Age Direction 
of trained 
method
HAN Group (1) F 26 U
COR Group (1) M 45 D
APR Group (1) F 36 D
SIN Group (1) F 17 D
COC Group (1) F 32 D
DAH Group (2) F 31 D
EES Group (2) F 30 U
KAL Group (2) M 35 U
KUH Group (2) M 36 U
MAI Group (2) F 34 U
OKI Group (2) F 32 U
PAH Group (2) F 30 U
STA Group (2) M 32 U
BAH Group (3) M 34 U
CAT Group (3) F 37 U
EHS Group (3) M 21 U
ENI Group (3) F 31 U
IDA Group (3) F 32 D
KEH Group (3) M 34 U
TAN Group (3) F 48 U
TOT Group (3) M 22 U
GRA Group (4) F 24 U
JOS Group (4) F 26 D
MAH Group (4) F 26 U
PIM Group (4) M 24 U
PIP Group (4) M 22 U
SHA Group (4) M 26 U
SUH Group (4) F 26 U
TAM Group (4) M 26 U
TOH Group (4) M 27 U
AHN Group (5) F 22 U
CHU Group (5) F 36 D
GAY Group (5) M 25 D
HUG Group (5) F 19 D
HUH Group (5) M 33 D
KIA Group (5) F 29 D
SAH Group (5) F 26 D
AJA Asocial M 39 D
AUS Asocial M 25 D
BET Asocial F 42 D
CHES Asocial M 21 U
GIS Asocial M 33 U
JOE Asocial M 45 D
KAM Asocial F 26 U
MIS Asocial F 30 U
SIM Asocial M 46 U
WOT Asocial F 34 D
BER Dyad F 39 D
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social learning in previous work (Aplin et al. 2015a, b; Hop-
per et al. 2008; Kendal et al. 2015; Watson et al. 2017). 
Some of the individuals at the study site had previously been 
exposed to horizontally oriented puzzle boxes (Hopper et al. 
2008; Kendal et al. 2015), and so, in order to minimise direc-
tional bias from prior experiments when sampling the same 
individuals, we gave the apparatus a vertical orientation. 
All training and experimental sessions were recorded using 
a Panasonic HC-X920 video camera. Videos were directly 
transferred in high-definition ‘.mts’ format to an ASUS lap-
top computer. All videos were coded using BORIS (Behav-
ioural Observation Research Interactive Software) version 
2.05 (2015).
Experimental procedure
All three conditions consisted of a training phase followed 
by open access. In the Group condition, the single MIN-I for 
each of five groups voluntarily separated from their group 
and learned to open the apparatus door by sliding it either 
up or down (counterbalanced across groups). At least 80% 
of the remaining group members (MAJ-I) were trained on 
the alternative method. This was followed by 5 h (except 
Group 3, which had four) of open access to the appara-
tus, 1 h on each consecutive weekday. In order to explore 
whether behavioural changes persisted without the presence 
of their group, after open access finished we retested MIN-I 
individuals in two 20-min ‘solo’ sessions. Finally, during 
the second week after finishing the open-access phase, we 
carried out one final hour of open-access testing. This was 
to determine whether any observed changes in behavioural 
preference were stable over time. The Dyad condition fol-
lowed the same procedure, using just two chimpanzees and 
1 h of open access. This amount of time was advised by 
care staff as being a realistic period in which any two given 
individuals would be comfortable being separated from their 
group as a pair, while also providing ample opportunities for 
observation (in the case of the dyad condition) and access 
to the puzzle box. The Asocial condition used individual 
chimpanzees, which were each provided with 30 min of open 
access to the apparatus. This was a length of time advised 
by care staff as a realistic period for which most individu-
als would be comfortable being separated from their group, 
while also providing the individual with opportunity for a 
large number of trials. The reward for successfully open-
ing the box in all conditions was a single grape. A detailed 
description of the methods used for training and each condi-
tion can be found below.
Group condition
The group condition comprised four stages: (1) training, (2) 
open access, (3) solo sessions and (4) a final open-access 
session, as detailed below.
Stage 1: Training
In each group, a single individual was selected as the MIN-I 
who was trained on one method of opening the apparatus 
(either ‘up’ or ‘down’). Previous work with the apparatus 
established that chimpanzees do not have a strong direc-
tional bias towards either option (Watson et al. 2017), but 
nevertheless we counterbalanced trained methods across 
groups (three MIN-I trained on ‘up’, two on ‘down’, see 
Table 1). MIN-I were chosen based on the advice of care 
staff who have known the animals for 5 + years, selecting in 
each case a female individual who was of medium-to-low 
social rank so that they would be able to gain access to the 
task but would not monopolise it. The rationale for this was 
that observational accounts of wild chimpanzees exhibiting 
conformist behaviour involve females migrating to a new 
group, which they typically enter at the lower end of the 
hierarchy (Luncz and Boesch 2014). All other members of 
the group were designated as MAJ-I. As many of these indi-
viduals as possible were trained on the alternative method 
to that which the MIN-I of their group was trained on. Four 
individuals in the Group condition were not willing to par-
ticipate in training at all and did not engage with the task 
(though they were physically present) during later sessions. 
This was the case for no more than one individual per group, 
still leaving an effective majority of individuals trained on 
the majority method.
The training process for method learning was facilitated 
by leaving the door of the puzzle box halfway open so that 
the trainee could see the reward and access it easily. On 
subsequent trials, the puzzle box door was left increasingly 
Table 1  (continued)
ID Condition Sex Age Direction 
of trained 
method
BIL Dyad M 23 D
CHEC Dyad F 35 D
DOD Dyad F 34 U
JES Dyad F 24 U
KUD Dyad M 35 U
LUL Dyad F 35 D
NAH Dyad F 35 U
NOW Dyad M 33 U
PEP Dyad F 50 U
PRI Dyad F 49 D
SAB Dyad F 49 D
Bold indicates individual was MIN-I
M male, F female, C captive, W wild
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closed so that the trainee had to move it to get the grape. 
This continued until the trainee was able to open it from a 
fully closed position. Models were considered to be ‘trained’ 
once they completed a total of 30 sequential uses of the 
trained method without deviation. No individuals deviated 
from the trained method during training, meaning that each 
individual completed exactly 30 training trials. The alterna-
tive direction was not blocked in any way. This number of 
trials was chosen as it was thought to be sufficient to instil a 
strong behavioural preference in the trained individual, mak-
ing deviation unlikely without potent external motivating 
factors (Hopper et al. 2011; Hrubesch et al. 2009; Marshall-
Pescini and Whiten 2008). With just two exceptions, all indi-
viduals in all conditions were trained while separated from 
the rest of their group. The two individuals who were not 
comfortable being separated from their group were therefore 
trained while in each other’s company.
Stage 2: Open access
Stage 2 consisted of 5 h of unrestricted access to the appara-
tus in a group context, during which time any individual was 
able to approach and manipulate the apparatus or observe 
others doing so. Access was divided into single hour-long 
testing sessions which, when possible, were carried out on 
consecutive days (Monday to Friday). One group received 
only 4 h of open access as it was not possible to test on the 
fifth day. The number of trials carried out by each MIN-I 
and MAJ-I as a whole is shown in Table 3. For each trial 
of Stage 2, the apparatus was baited with a single grape in 
each reward chamber and pushed towards the mesh of an 
enclosure, facing forwards, and held there until an individ-
ual approached and successfully opened the door. After an 
individual retrieved a reward, the apparatus was withdrawn 
by 1 m, the door was reset to the central position, and the 
reward chambers were both re-baited. When re-setting the 
door, the apparatus was covered with a cloth to avoid direc-
tional cues from the experimenter. If the door was partially 
opened by an individual and no further interaction occurred 
for 10 s, the apparatus was withdrawn and reset as described 
above. Any individuals within 3 m whose heads were ori-
ented towards the puzzle box and did not have their view 
obviously obstructed were recorded as having observed the 
trial.
Stage 3: Solo sessions
At 3–5 days after completion of Stage 2, MIN-I were sepa-
rated from their group and given 20 min of access to the puz-
zle box (‘Solo Session 1’). This happened again 7–10 days 
following Solo Session 1 (‘Solo Session 2’). The purpose 
of these sessions was to discover whether any behavioural 
changes in MIN-I were maintained in the absence of 
observers.
Stage 4: Final open‑access session
Between 4 and 8 days after Stage 3, the entire group was 
given a final open-access session with the apparatus, lasting 
1 h. This followed the same protocol as Stage 2. The purpose 
of this was to determine whether any behavioural changes in 
MIN-I were persistent over time.
Dyad condition
For each of the six dyads (N = 12), two individuals were 
selected from the same group. Individuals were selected 
based on the advice of care staff regarding which individu-
als were likely to be comfortable sharing a room with each 
other for an hour. Once selected, each individual in the dyad 
was individually trained on alternative methods (‘up’ and 
‘down’) of opening the apparatus. The procedure for train-
ing followed the same protocol as for MIN-I in the Group 
condition. Two individuals in the Dyad condition had prior 
exposure to the task and so were not included for analysis 
(but their partner was).
The day after training had taken place for a dyad, the two 
individuals were separated from their group, as a pair, for 
1 h. During this hour, unrestricted access to the apparatus 
was provided. This followed the same procedure as Stage 2 
of the Group condition. This open-access phase of the Dyad 
condition was limited to 1 h, as the feasibility of getting two 
specific individuals alone together on five consecutive days 
was expected to be low. Furthermore, based on the advice 
of care staff, 1 h was judged to be a length of time in which 
two individuals would reliably participate in the task before 
becoming noticeably motivated to return to their group. Sec-
ondly, prior work (Watson et al. 2017) using the same puzzle 
box suggested the box could be opened and re-baited at a 
rate of roughly two trials per min. Given the rapid onset of 
conformist behaviour in previous studies (Aplin et al. 2015b; 
Pike and Laland 2010; van de Waal et al. 2013) and indeed 
the fact that all MIN-I who switched did so within their 
first five trials, this was judged to be an adequate amount of 
exposure to the task for behavioural switching to manifest.
Asocial condition
Individuals (N = 10) in the Asocial condition received the 
same training as those in the Dyad condition. The next 
day, subjects received 30 min of unrestricted access to the 
apparatus while alone, having never observed another indi-
vidual interact with it. The purpose of this condition was to 
determine how frequently chimpanzees would explore the 
untrained method when not provided with social information 
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about it, to determine whether this is sufficient to explain 
switching patterns in the Group and Dyad conditions. Ses-
sions were limited to 30 min primarily to minimise the 
amount of time that individuals spent alone and separated 
from group mates. Furthermore, 30 min allowed for a poten-
tial of ~ 60 trials per individual, which was judged to be suf-
ficient access to the task for motivated individuals to explore 
an alternative method.
Statistical analyses
We used generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs), using 
R packages ‘lme4’ and ‘MuMin’ (Bates et al. 2015; MuMIn 
2016) with a binomial error structure and a logit link func-
tion to determine whether ‘Condition’ (MIN-I vs. MAJ-I, 
MIN-I vs. Dyad and Dyad vs. Asocial) had a significant 
effect upon our response variable: a binary indicator of 
whether an individual used their trained or untrained method 
on any given trial. When comparing MIN-I with MAJ-I and 
MIN-I with Dyad conditions, we also fit as a fixed effect the 
number of demonstrations an individual had observed of 
their untrained method on each trial.
In each case, we fitted a ‘full’ model containing all fixed 
effects. Any non-significant effects were dropped from the 
model to create a ‘final’ model, which we then compared 
with the ‘null’ model (no fixed effects) using a likelihood 
ratio test to determine whether either was a significantly 
better fit for the data. Because each individual contributed 
multiple data points, we fitted Individual as a random fac-
tor in all models. In the first analysis, comparing MIN-I and 
MAJ-I responses, test session (h from 1 to 5) was also fitted 
as a random effect. For each final model, we also calculated 
a marginal R2 value, which describes the proportion of vari-
ance explained by the fixed effects (Nakagawa and Schielzeth 
2013). We used the R package ‘rptR’ (Schielzeth and Naka-
gawa 2011) to estimate whether there was a significant effect 
of repeatability (where H0 is R = 0) between the proportion of 
trials in which MIN-I used their untrained method firstly in 
Stages 2 and 3 and then in Stages 2 and 4. All analyses were 
conducted in R v.3.2.3 (R Development Core Team 2016 
with R Studio v.0.99.491 (R Studio Team 2015).
Inter-observer reliability was carried out with an inde-
pendent observer on the method (‘up’ or ‘down’) used in 
thirty 30-s video clips of individuals opening the apparatus, 
as well as which individuals observed those demonstrations, 
with 100% agreement. The datasets analysed during the 
current study are available in the open science framework 
repository and can be accessed at: https ://osf.io/seq8b /.
Results
Analysis 1: MIN‑I versus MAJ‑I
In the Group condition, four out of five MIN-I learned the 
majority method, all of whom did so after observing at least 
one MAJ-I, but before observing the majority of their group 
(Table 2). Three of these individuals used their untrained 
method on the majority of trials in each test session, a 
response already apparent in the first 1-h session, but which 
was sustained also in the later sessions (Fig. 2, Table 3). 
All individuals in both MIN-I and MAJ-I had multiple 
observations of their untrained method by the end of the 
fifth hour of testing (MIN-I: median = 104, minimum = 72, 
maximum = 117, MAJ-I: median = 31, minimum = 2, maxi-
mum = 109). All individuals in both conditions participated 
in at least one trial by the end of the fifth hour of testing 
(MIN-I: median = 124, minimum = 37, maximum = 339, 
MAJ-I: median = 80, minimum = 1, maximum = 289). 
With the full model, we found a significant effect of Condi-
tion, but not frequency of observations of an individual’s 
untrained method, on switching behaviour. Consequently, 
we dropped frequency of observations as a fixed effect in 
the final model (Table 4). This final model was found to 
be a significantly better fit for the data than the null model 
(likelihood ratio test: X2 = 8.333, df = 1, p = 0.003, Table S1). 
With the final model, we estimated that the probability that 
MIN-I would switch to their untrained method on any given 
trial was 0.54 (95% CI 0.262, 0.791), whereas the probabil-
ity of MAJ-I switching methods was less than 0.001 (95% 
CI 0.000, 0.002). The proportion of variance explained by 
the fixed effects in the final model was R2 = 0.515. Finally, 
we examined whether the number of MAJ-I, or number of 
observations of MAJ-I, that MIN-I had observed using their 
untrained method influenced their choice of method on any 
given trial. Neither number of observations nor number of 
Table 2  Trial number on 
which MIN-I first switched to 
untrained method, number of 
individuals they had observed 
using this method by that point, 
and total number of group mates 
(minus MIN-I)
ID Trial of first switch Hour of first switch Number MAJ-I seen 
at the time of switch
No. group mates 
that participated
Total 
group 
size
JOS No switch No switch No switch (6 seen) 6 8
HAN 2 1 1 4 4
DAH 4 2 3 6 7
IDA 4 1 2 6 7
AHN 2 1 2 6 6
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individuals was found to have a significant effect on method 
choice (Table 4).
It was found that there was non-significant repeatabil-
ity between Stages 2 and 3 (R = 0.309, 95% CI 0, 0.852, 
p = 0.322), suggesting that MIN-I behaved differently 
depending on whether they were in a group context or by 
themselves (Fig. 2a, Table 3). There was a significant effect 
of repeatability between Stages 2 and 4 (R = 0.862, 95% 
CI 0.183, 0.981, p = 0.007), demonstrating that switching 
behaviour was persistent over time. The confidence intervals 
for these estimates are very wide due to the small sample 
size used to calculate them, so should be interpreted with 
caution (Zou 2012).
Analysis 2: Dyad versus Asocial conditions
Of all individuals in the Dyad condition (N = 12), only one 
explored the method demonstrated by their partner (2/65 
trials). Only one individual in the Asocial condition (N = 10) 
discovered the untrained method and used it on only a single 
trial out of 10. Individuals in the Asocial condition had a 
median of 55 trials (range 10–80), while individuals in the 
Dyad condition had a median of 64 trials (range 6–100). 
In the full model comparing Dyad and Asocial individu-
als, there was no significant effect of Condition (Table 4). 
Consequently, we dropped this fixed effect and use the null 
model as our final model, from which the full model did 
not significantly differ (log-likelihood ratio test: X2 = 0.012, 
df = 1, p = 9135). From this final model, we calculated that 
the probability with which any individual would switch to 
their untrained method on any given trial was less than 0.001 
(95% CI 0.000, 0.003).
Analysis 3: MIN‑I versus Dyad conditions
The median number of observations in Dyad and MIN-I 
conditions was 18 (range 2–34) and 29 (range 5–46), 
respectively, and the two groups did not differ significantly 
(nDyad = 10, nminority = 5, U = 18, p = 0.439, two-tailed) in 
their number of observations at the time of switching nor 
their total number of observations (nDyad = 10, nminority = 5, 
U = 14, p = 0.206, two-tailed, Fig. 3).
Our full model included both condition (MIN-I vs. Dyad) 
and frequency of observations as fixed effects (Table S1). 
In this model, frequency of observations refers to the num-
ber of observations that an individual had made prior to the 
trial when they first used their untrained method. Where an 
individual never used their untrained method, we used the 
number of observations made at the time of their final trial 
in their first hour of testing. In the full model, Condition was 
found to have a significant effect but number of observations 
did not. To explore whether frequency of observations might 
influence MIN-I differently to those in the Dyad condition, 
we also fitted a model with an interaction between number 
of observations and Condition. In this interaction model, 
neither the interaction of frequency of observations with 
Condition nor frequency of observations itself was found to 
have a significant effect on switching behaviour (Table S1). 
Consequently, we dropped both the interaction and fixed 
effect of number of observations from the final model. In the 
Fig. 2  Proportion of trials in which an individual used their untrained 
method in each hour. a MIN-I (N = 5) across all stages, b MAJ-I 
(N = 23) in Stage 2. Each line represents an individual. Dashed verti-
cal lines serve as a visual aid for contrasting solo and group stages. 
Points in b are jittered to avoid overlapping. Not all individuals par-
ticipated in all sessions
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final model, Condition was found to have a significant effect 
on whether individual’s switched to their untrained method 
on a given trial (Table 4), with an estimated probability that 
MIN-I would switch on a given trial of 0.518 (95% CI 0.447, 
1) and a probability that individuals in the Dyad condition 
would switch of less than 0.001 (95% CI 0.000, 0.003). The 
proportion of variance explained by the fixed effects in the 
full model was R2 = 0.572.
Table 3  Number of trials MIN-I 
and corresponding MAJ-I used 
their trained and untrained 
methods in each test session
Dashes indicate that no testing took place
ID Method Hour 1 Hour 2 Hour 3 Hour 4 Hour 5 Solo 1 Solo 2 Hour 6 Total
JOS Trained 14 11 3 9 0 46 37 35 155
Untrained 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 0 13
Total 14 11 3 9 0 48 48 35 168
MAJ-I Trained 79 76 57 91 94 – – 85 482
Untrained 1 1 14 3 2 – – 4 25
Total 80 77 71 94 96 – – 89 507
HAN Trained 4 25 4 10 2 0 2 2 49
Untrained 79 34 80 47 54 40 45 42 421
Total 83 59 84 57 56 40 47 44 470
MAJ-I Trained 30 87 64 50 57 – – 76 364
Untrained 0 0 0 0 0 – – 0 0
Total 30 87 64 50 57 – – 76 364
DAH Trained 2 6 0 2 0 7 25 14 56
Untrained 0 39 0 24 0 45 21 49 178
Total 2 45 0 26 0 52 46 63 234
MAJ-I Trained 70 69 119 86 123 – – 57 524
Untrained 0 0 0 0 0 – – 0 0
Total 70 69 119 86 123 – – 57 524
IDA Trained 3 9 7 1 – 63 59 7 149
Untrained 23 46 73 44 – 0 0 35 221
Total 26 55 80 45 – 63 59 42 370
MAJ-I Trained 88 63 43 74 – – – 78 346
Untrained 0 1 0 0 – – – 0 1
Total 88 64 43 74 – – – 78 347
AHN Trained 5 18 0 23 19 14 52 6 137
Untrained 2 7 37 9 4 43 7 2 111
Total 7 25 37 32 23 57 59 8 176
MAJ-I Trained 111 66 79 85 84 – – 90 515
Untrained 1 1 0 1 4 – – 0 7
Total 112 67 79 86 88 – – 90 522
Table 4  Summary outputs for each final model tested
Conditions compared Fixed effect Beta SE Lower 95% Upper 95% CI Z p
MIN-I versus MAJ-I Intercept − 10.778 2.215 − 15.12 − 6.436 − 4.866 –
Condition 10.926 2.82 5.399 16.452 3.875 < 0.001
Within MIN-I Intercept 1.712 1.715 − 1.649 5.074 0.998 0.318
N individuals seen − 0.089 0.258 − 0.594 0.417 − 0.343 0.732
N trials seen − 0.014 0.009 0.033 0.004 − 1.484 0.138
Dyad Intercept 11.457 3.632 − 18.475 − 4.338 − 3.155 –
Versus asocial Condition 0.377 3.469 − 6.422 7.176 0.109 0.913
MIN-I versus Dyad Intercept − 8.562 1.897 12.279 4.844 − 4.514 –
Condition 8.948 2.242 4.554 13.342 3.991 < 0.001
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Discussion
Results showed that minority individuals (MIN-I) were, 
relative to majority individuals (MAJ-I), highly likely to 
switch from a pre-existing method to a socially demon-
strated alternative in a group context, even though neither 
method was more efficient or productive. Moreover, MIN-I 
who switched methods did so rapidly (within first 5 trials, 
Table 2) and for three of those four individuals the change in 
behavioural preference remained relatively stable over time 
in group contexts (Fig. 2a). Conversely, most MAJ-I (all but 
three) faced with demonstrations of an alternative, equally 
rewarding behaviour from a lone minority did not switch 
method (Fig. 2b). Most individuals did not deviate from a 
pre-existing method when exposed to the alternative method 
of a single conspecific, nor did individuals who received 
no social information independently discover the alterna-
tive method. Crucially, the evidence does not support the 
possibility that switching was influenced by the frequency 
of observations (Fig. 3b), nor the number of individuals 
observed using the alternative method (Table 2, Table 4). 
Indeed, one MIN-I (‘HAN’) switched after observing just 
a handful of trials of a single individual. Because MIN-I 
were not aware that the observed method was preferred by 
the majority at the time of switching, this outcome does 
not easily align with conventional definitions of conformity. 
Due to the open-diffusion paradigm used, we were unable to 
systematically test each MIN-I after each additional group 
member was observed. This could be achieved in future 
using a more controlled design such as that used in Haun 
et al. (2014), but this is not straightforward in open-diffusion 
paradigms whose purpose is to simulate more naturalistic 
learning contexts. Consequently, it is not possible from the 
Group condition alone to determine whether all MIN-I who 
switched methods would, like ‘HAN’, have done so after 
observing just a single individual.
These results suggest that knowledgeable chimpanzees 
behave in a largely conservative manner unless they find 
themselves in a group context. Within a group context, most 
individuals switched to a consistently demonstrated behav-
iour. This outcome contrasts with prior work where it was 
found that individuals were likely to behave in a conserva-
tive manner (van Leeuwen et al. 2013; Haun et al. 2014; 
Vale et al. 2017). Our study differed methodologically from 
Haun et al. (2014) and Vale et al. (2017) in that our subjects 
were naïve to the untrained method before the Group con-
dition, whereas in these earlier studies the behaviour may 
have acquired a negative valence through being previously 
experienced as ineffective (Haun et al. 2014) or associated 
with a less palatable food reward (Vale et al. 2017). Such 
was not the case in van Leeuwen et al. (2013), but in this 
case the trained behaviour was demonstrated by multiple 
group mates, potentially providing social reinforcement 
for the behaviour before subjects observed the untrained 
method. Moreover, changes in behavioural preference elic-
ited in this context had a rapid onset (Table 2) and were sta-
ble over time, as MIN-I demonstrated behaviour consistent 
with their performance in the initial experimental period in 
an additional group session carried out 3 weeks afterwards 
(see Fig. 3). The importance of a group context in eliciting 
the use of an observed method is further reflected in the 
fact that there was no statistically significant repeatability 
in switching behaviour between the open-diffusion social 
context of Stage 2 and the solo context of Stage 3. This trend 
then reversed when individuals were put back into a group 
context for Stage 4, which had high repeatability with Stage 
2. However, it is worth noting that there was substantial 
individual variation in how individuals behaved during the 
Fig. 3  Number of times indi-
viduals in the Dyad condition 
(a) and MIN-I (b) observed 
individuals using their untrained 
method. Circles represent total 
number of observations in first 
hour of testing. Triangles repre-
sent number of observations by 
the time of an individual’s first 
switching event
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solo context of Stage 3, with one individual (HAN) retain-
ing a strong preference for their untrained method, two oth-
ers (AHN, IDA), gradually switching back to their trained 
method, one (DAH) showing a strong preference for their 
trained method and another (JOS) using their untrained 
method for the first time (Table 3).
In sum, our results suggest that being in a group context 
elicited the prioritisation of a very limited number of obser-
vations of a demonstrated method over well-established, pre-
existing behaviours. This is somewhat surprising given that 
previous research has suggested that chimpanzees are highly 
conservative with regards to adopting novel behaviours. We 
suggest that social context is therefore a largely unexplored 
but potentially potent influence on behavioural flexibility 
and social learning that is worthy of further attention.
One way in which the group context may have elicited 
changes in behavioural preference is the possibility that 
MIN-I made inferences about the rest of the present group’s 
behavioural preferences based on their observations of 
a subset of individuals, and acted in a conformist fashion 
in accordance with this prediction. A similar proclivity to 
converge on perceived social norms, estimated from lim-
ited personal experience, has been established in humans 
(Rimal and Real 2005; Terry et al. 1999), and this capac-
ity to generalise from small samples to a wider popula-
tion is present in human infants as young as 8 months old 
(Denison and Xu 2010; Téglás et al. 2007; Xu and Garcia 
2008). While all four great ape species have been shown 
to generalise from populations to samples (Rakoczy et al. 
2014), evidence for inferences from samples to populations 
is somewhat mixed (Eckert et al. 2017). The phenomenon 
we have identified might correspond with ‘quorum sens-
ing’, defined by Sumpter and Pratt (2009) as when ‘threshold 
group sizes trigger key changes in behaviour’. Although to 
our knowledge studies explicitly focused on this topic have 
hitherto been conducted on only insects (e.g. Pratt 2005) and 
fish (Ward et al. 2012), our results suggest more attention 
to such phenomena in primates and other vertebrates may 
prove fruitful.
Due to our study sharing similar behavioural outcomes 
to conformity, alternative explanations levelled at studies 
reporting this phenomenon (Acerbi et al. 2016; Van Leeu-
wen and Haun 2013, 2014; Van Leeuwen et al. 2015) should 
also be considered in relation to our results. For example, 
that individuals may ‘copy when uncertain’, such as when 
moving to a novel environment, is one alternative expla-
nation offered (Van Leeuwen et al. 2015) for behavioural 
convergence in great tits (Aplin et al. 2015b) and vervet 
monkeys (van de Waal et al. 2013). In the case of our study, 
there were no such environmental changes and therefore 
no obvious reason for uncertainty-triggered copying. If 
through some mistake of design, some unintentional uncer-
tainty was introduced by the paradigm, we would expect to 
see individuals in the Dyad condition also prioritise social 
information over their pre-existing method, but this was not 
the case. It has also been suggested that randomly copying 
a single individual could create an illusion of conformity to 
the options demonstrated by a majority in a group (Acerbi 
et al. 2016; Van Leeuwen et al. 2015). However, much pre-
vious research in chimpanzees has reported conservatism 
rather any evidence of random copying of observed meth-
ods (Davis et al. 2016; Haun et al. 2014; Hrubesch et al. 
2009; Van Leeuwen et al. 2013). More importantly, random 
copying is not consistent with the outcome of our Dyad con-
dition, where there was only a single individual to choose 
from, yet all but one individual remained faithful to their 
trained method.
A bias towards copying dominant individuals (‘rank 
bias’) is thought to influence from whom naïve chimpanzees 
choose to learn (Horner et al. 2010; Kendal et al. 2015) and 
therefore could also conceivably influence the social learn-
ing decisions of knowledgeable individuals. This would fit 
the pattern of results observed in the Group condition, as 
MIN-I were all judged as being medium to low in social rank 
by care staff and were therefore exposed to higher-ranking 
demonstrators than themselves. While we cannot rule this 
out entirely, it would be inconsistent with the results of the 
Dyad condition. Linear rank assessments for the Dyad con-
dition were not practical, but rank disparities were inevitable 
due to the linear hierarchy of chimpanzee social structure. 
However, no individuals in the Dyad condition adopted their 
partner’s method. Moreover, studies in which a proportion 
of individuals with pre-existing behaviours were faced with 
more prestigious or more dominant demonstrators of the 
alternative method did not find evidence of behavioural 
switching (Haun et al. 2014; Van Leeuwen et al. 2013). This 
suggests that while naïve chimpanzees may selectively copy 
dominant models (Horner et al. 2010; Kendal et al. 2015, 
but see Watson et al. 2017), chimpanzees with an estab-
lished method will not forego this in order to converge on 
the behaviour of these individuals.
We would emphasise, however, that while various 
social learning biases are often treated as competing 
explanations for the emergence of traditions, it is possi-
ble that they act in complementary ways and that differ-
ent individuals make use of different learning strategies 
depending on their own life history. For example, while 
all children preferentially copy competent models, some 
prefer to copy a majority when given the choice (Burdett 
et al. 2016). It seems likely that similar variation could 
exist within the social learning habits of non-human spe-
cies, and the individual differences that may contribute 
towards such variation will continue to confound studies 
of unitary biases until research on combinatorial effects 
is pursued. Our results are suggestive of notable indi-
vidual differences in behavioural social information use. 
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Most MIN-I rapidly converged on behaviours observed 
in a group context, while others did not, even after exten-
sive exposure to demonstrations of the alternative method 
from a large number of individuals. Indeed, social learning 
biases are expected to vary between individuals within a 
species, since different phenotypic and life history factors 
may differently benefit from a given bias (Mesoudi et al. 
2016). For example, our selection criteria for MIN-I that 
they had to be female low-to-middle social rank may have 
inadvertently selected for a class of individuals who tend 
to have a particularly high proclivity for social informa-
tion. A way to control for this in future designs would 
be to use the same individuals in both Group and Dyad 
conditions—using different, but similar, puzzle boxes for 
each condition. This repeated-measures design would help 
minimise the confound of individual differences and iso-
late the influence of context. Our findings are broadly com-
parable with human conformity studies where, while many 
individuals conform to unanimous majorities, most do not 
(Asch 1951). Given the fission–fusion social structure that 
typifies wild chimpanzees, in the wild, individuals will 
often have information on the preferences of only a small 
sample of the larger community to which they belong, so 
being prepared to make inferences from a small sample to 
a larger group may be an adaptive strategy for them. They 
may also need to be somewhat flexible in terms of who 
they are motivated to socially learn from. Accordingly, we 
suggest that in future work additional attention be placed 
on the individual characteristics of the learners, as well as 
the models, and the contextual factors that may promote 
or inhibit ‘risky’ behaviour, such as exploring new meth-
ods (Davis et al. 2016). The use of methodologies that 
discriminate between multiple social learning biases (e.g. 
Kendal et al. 2015) operating at once in a single group, or 
a single individual, may be crucial.
Amongst the factors influencing social learning to 
be investigated in the future, based on our findings we 
strongly encourage the examination of how the presence 
and size of a group may influence copying decisions of 
animals. Our findings suggest that chimpanzees are more 
likely to relinquish existing behaviours in the presence of 
a social group, resulting in a convergence on an equally 
rewarding, socially demonstrated alternative. We submit 
this as a potential commonality between human and non-
human animals in the potency of social influence, with 
important implications for the study of cultural diffusion.
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